





















geral,	 a	 dos	 países	 do	 norte	 ocidental)	 e	 as	 políticas	 criminais	 que	 as	
produziram	são	o	resultado	da	 transformação	das	sociedades	democráticas	
de	sociedades	inclusivas,	ou	seja,	caracterizadas	pela	progressiva	“concessão	
de	 poder	 econômico	 e	 social	 aos	mais	 frágeis”,	 nas	 palavras	 de	 Du	 Bois,	 à	
sociedades	 excludentes,	 caracterizadas	 pela	marginalização	 progressiva	 de	
grandes	grupos	de	indivíduos,	principalmente	migrantes.	




In	 this	 essay	 I	will	 argue	 that	 the	 current	 situation	 of	 Italian	 prisons	 (and,	
more	generally,	 those	 in	north-western	countries)	and	the	criminal	policies	
that	produced	it,	are	the	result	of	the	transformation	of	democratic	societies	
from	 inclusive	societies,	 that	 is,	 characterized	by	 the	progressive	«giving	of	
economic	 and	 social	 power	 to	 the	 powerless»,	 in	 the	words	 of	 Du	 Bois,	 to	





                                                










that	 prison,	 or	 better,	 the	 “penitentiary”,	was	 born	 and	 became	 established	 as	 a	 punitive	 tool	




appropriate	 way	 the	 rights	 that	 an	 increasingly	 liberal	 (and	 then	 liberal-democratic)	 state	
granted	to	them.	The	democratization	of	the	nation-state,	the	extension	of	suffrage,	went	hand	in	




have	 seen	 the	progressive	 social	 and	political	 inclusion	of	 the	poorest	 classes.	On	 the	political	
level,	 what	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 were	 considered	 the	 dangerous	 classes	 slowly	 became,	
through	 the	 extension	 of	 suffrage,	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 demos	 that	 exercised	 political	
sovereignty.	 The	 ideal	 point	 of	 arrival	 of	 this	 process	 is,	 as	 Thomas	H.	Marshall	 	 (1950,	 p.	 8)	
wrote	in	his	classic	work,	“citizenship”	understood	as	“a	kind	of	basic	human	equality	associated	
with	the	concept	of	full	membership	of	a	community”.	
The	precondition	 for	 the	development	of	democracies	has	been,	more	or	 less	explicitly,	 the	
conviction	 that	 in	 the	exercise	of	 their	 rights,	 individuals	must	behave	according	 to	moral	and	
rational	 principles	 (two	 adjectives	 that	 in	 the	 eighteenth-nineteenth	 century	 Enlightenment	
contractualism	have	almost	synonymous	value):	“discipline”	conforms	individuals	to	the	criteria	
of	 the	order	 in	which	they	are	placed.	As	Thomas	L.	Dumm	(1987,	p.	6)	pointed	out,	Alexis	de	
Tocqueville	 was	 the	 first	 to	 realize	 that	 “the	 penitentiary	 system	 formed	 the	 epistemological	





extensive	 suffrage,	 but	 also	 the	 establishment	 of	 institutions	 which	 would	 encourage	 the	
internalization	of	liberal	democratic	values,	the	creation	of	individuals	who	would	learn	how	
to	rule	their	selves.	(Dumm,	1987,	p.	6)	
Examining	 the	 first	 democratic	 government	 that,	 transcending	 the	 urban	dimension	 that	
                                                
2	 Anderson	 (2006,	 81-82)	 underlines	 the	 democratic	 and	 egalitarian	 significance	 of	 nineteenth-century	 nationalism:	 “If	
‘Hungarians’	deserved	a	national	state,	then	that	meant	Hungarians,	all	of	them;	it	meant	a	state	in	which	the	ultimate	locus	of	




this	 regime	had	had	 for	 centuries,	 had	 spread	 over	 a	much	 larger	 territory	 and	population,	
Tocqueville	 observed	 how	 democracy	 exerts	 a	 strong	 pressure	 towards	 conformism	 and	
involves	 the	 criminalization	 and	 institutionalization	 of	 the	 ‘too’	 different.	 In	 the	 nineteenth	
century	United	States,	those	who	were	not	believed	to	have	the	competence	to	exercise	their	
rights	were	 thrown	 back	 into	 the	 darkness	 of	 prisons	 and	 excluded	 from	 the	 possibility	 of	
choosing	who	could	govern.	
In	 De	 la	 démocratie	 en	 Amérique	 (1840),	 the	 rationale	 behind	 disciplinary	 institutions	
emerges	 as	 a	 structural	 feature	 of	 liberal-democratic	 regimes.	 Tocqueville,	 in	 fact,	 studying	
the	 first	 great	 liberal-democratic	 regime,	 affirms	 that	 the	 power	 that	 “took	 hold	 of	 bodies”,	
which	 had	 guaranteed	 the	 survival	 of	 the	 absolutist	 regimes,	 was	 not	 suitable	 for	 liberal-
democracies:	to	govern	these	regimes,	we	do	not	need	a	bloody	power,	but	a	power	capable	of	
“taking	hold	of	souls”.	Discipline,	 that	 is	 the	system	of	practices	 that	 invests	 the	 individual’s	
body	 to	 make	 it	 socially	 compatible	 and	 economically	 productive,	 is	 the	 technology	 which	
expresses	this	power.	And	to	him	the	grip	on	souls,	although	less	bloody,	does	not	seem	more	




subjects’	 will.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 it	 would	 therefore	 not	 be	 by	 chance	 that	 modern	
disciplinary	 institutions	 originally	 developed	 in	 the	United	 States,	 that	 is,	 in	 the	 first	major	
country	to	give	itself	a	republican	government.		





possibility	 of	 acquiring	 strong	 and	 numerous	 armies.	 State	 power	 became	 based	 on	 the	
assumption	 that	 it	has	a	population	and	must	 intervene	on	 it,	 regulating	 the	mechanisms	of	
birth	and	death,	setting	the	conditions	of	life.	Disciplinary	technologies	and	police	science	are	
intended	 to	 guarantee	 the	 well-being	 of	 the	 national	 population	 and,	 through	 this,	 state	
power.	A	certain	 ‘population’,	as	an	entity	distinct	 from	the	 ‘labour	force’	and	as	a	delimited	
portion	 of	 the	 ‘human	 species’,	 is	 defined	 by	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 nation-state:	 it	 is	 the	
policies	 that	 invest	 and	mobilize	 it	 for	 the	 achievement	 of	 state	 power	 that	 constitute	 and	
identify	it.		
Social	 control	 and	 criminal	 policy	 in	 particular	 were	 openly	 aimed	 at	 strengthening,	 or	
creating	 if	necessary,	 individual	 responsibility.	The	weaker	 classes	were	driven	 (forced?)	 to	
adapt	 to	new	social	conditions	 through	preaching	and	the	 institutional	enactment	of	virtues	
capable	 of	 replacing	 the	morals	 of	 the	medieval	 society	 now	 in	 crisis.	 It	 was	 a	widespread	
conviction	that	the	belief	in	free	will	and	personal	reliability,	associated	with	the	concomitant	







revolution	 and	 the	 development	 of	 suburbs.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 new	 institutions	 made	 it	
possible	 to	conceptualize	crime	 in	 irreducibly	 individual	 terms.	That	 they	were	 the	solution	 to	
the	problems	of	 crime	meant	 that	 this	was	not	 a	 collective	 social	 disobedience	 resulting	 from	
famine	and	poverty	driving	whole	masses	of	individuals	to	commit	various	types	of	offences,	but	
an	entirely	personal	 loss	 in	sin	and	error.	The	 fascination	of	 institutional	 solutions	 lay	 in	 their	
promising	to	restore	order	and	at	the	same	time	in	their	strictly	individualistic	interpretation	of	
crime.	The	key	idea	was	that	for	every	offender	punishment	should	consist	primarily	in	the	duty	





reversal	 that	was	 in	 tune,	 if	 not	with	 the	 letter	 of	 Enlightenment	 theories,	 at	 least	with	 their	
inspiring	 values.	 Prison	 turned	 the	 strategy	 of	 social	 defence	 upside	 down:	 it	 went	 from	
conceiving	the	offender	as	a	person	to	be	annihilated	to	the	 idea	that	he	remained,	despite	his	
violation	 of	 the	 rules,	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 society,	 so	 that	 punishment	 should	 be	 aimed	 at	 his	
reintegration	into	the	social	context.	This	crucial	function	of	the	penitentiary	became	the	pivot	of	
the	strategy	of	social	control	with	the	rise	of	the	capitalist	production	system.	At	the	time	of	the	
‘original	accumulation’	and	the	enclosures,	 the	penitentiary	 institutions	seemed	to	be	 the	right	
tool	 to	 transform	 the	 masses	 of	 former	 peasants	 immigrating	 to	 the	 cities	 into	 industrial	
workmen.	As	Georg	Rusche	and	Otto	Kirchheimer	(1939)	have	famously	shown,	the	penitentiary	
emerged	as	a	place	of	forced	socialization	and	was	structured	on	the	productive	model,	 first	of	
manufacture	 and	 then	 of	 the	 factory,	 from	 which	 it	 borrowed	 its	 internal	 organization.	 The	




















Thus,	 throughout	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 and	much	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	work	 and	 its	
ethics	 were	 the	 connective	 tissue	 of	 disciplinary	 techniques,	 they	 represented	 the	 integrative	
mechanism	of	 society	 and	 therefore	 the	 tool	 of	 social	 reintegration.	 This	 role,	 indeed	 strongly	
questioned	 during	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 has	 been	 finally	 lost	 with	







it	makes	no	sense	 to	 try	 to	bring	 the	often	reluctant	 categories	of	 the	 ‘without	a	boss’	back	 to	
work.	In	these	conditions,	detention	can	hardly	lay	claim	to	its	social	rationality	as	a	school	for	
starting	 work,	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 second-best	 mode,	 imposed	 by	 force,	 to	 increase	 the	 ranks	 of	
productive	labour	in	social	sectors	that	prove	impermeable	to	voluntary	recruitment,	as	was	the	
case	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 The	 problem	 today	 seems	 to	 arise	 in	 exactly	 opposite	 terms:	
companies	are	mostly	committed	to	getting	rid	of	superfluous	workers,	for	whom	there	are	no	








Within	global	markets,	 it	 is	above	all	 ‘external	objective	conditions’	which,	by	determining	 the	







ethic,	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 dissolved.	 Society	 continues	 to	 demand	 rigour	 and	 discipline	 from	
those	who	work	or	prepare	for	work,	but	is	no	longer	able	to	ensure	any	success	for	those	who	
are	 capable	of	 self-discipline.	This	new	picture	 could	not	but	have	 consequences	also	on	 ‘total	
institutions’:	 they	 are	 less	 and	 less	 disciplinary	 institutions	 and	 more	 and	 more	 containing	
institutions.	 If	 inculcating	 work	 ethics	 does	 not	 guarantee	 any	 job	 placement,	 even	 the	 last	










developing	 work	 ethics,	 at	 building	 the	 ‘docile	 body’	 to	 be	 employed	 nor	 at	 the	 productive	





Thus,	 the	welfare	 state	apparatus	was	born	out	of	 the	 conviction	 that	each	state	must	 take	









The	 development	 of	welfarist	 policies	 peaked	 in	 the	 1970s,	when	 Keynesianism	 and	 Fordism	
were	combined.		
For	 over	 a	 hundred	 years	 the	 two	 locomotives	 –	 ‘discipline’	 and	market	 –	 ran	 on	 parallel	
tracks,	favouring	the	state’s	development.	In	the	first	phase	the	economy	seemed	to	need	above	
all	 disciplined	 workforce,	 so	 that	 the	 developments	 of	 market	 and	 discipline	 seemed,	 as	 in	
Bentham’s	design,	perfectly	symbiotic.	When	it	turned	out	that	this	synergy	was	an	illusion	and	
that	 disciplining	 the	 labour	 force	 often	 did	 not	 meet	 market	 needs,	 welfarist	 policies	 were	
complemented	 by	 the	 Fordist	 ones.	 This	 was	 a	 complete	 reversal	 of	 the	 eighteenth-century	
Smithian	 idea	 that	 poverty,	 by	 activating	 human	 resources,	 is	 a	 key	 element	 in	 stimulating	
economic	growth.	The	Fordist	approach	shifts	focus	from	the	labour	market	to	the	goods	market,	
assuming	 that	 it	 is	 wealth,	 and	 not	 poverty,	 that	 represents	 the	 fundamental	 stimulus	 for	
economic	 growth,	 because	 only	 wealth	 is	 able	 to	 produce	 consumption	 and	 therefore	 to	
stimulate	 the	 demand	 that	 activates	 production.	 The	 eighteenth	 century	 approach,	 in	 its	
Smithian,	 Malthusian	 and	 Benthamian	 versions,	 was	 linked	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 only	 limit	 to	
production	was	the	lack	of	manpower.	If	there	had	been	manpower,	wealth	could	have	increased	
indefinitely.	The	Fordist	 thesis	 instead	 takes	 into	 account	 the	overproduction	 crisis	of	 the	 late	
nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries,	that	is,	the	fact	that	without	demand	production	does	
not	 generate	 wealth.	 It	 was	 clear	 by	 then	 that	 the	 problem	 was	 not	 so	 much	 a	 scarcity	 of	
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producers,	 as	 Bentham	 and	 Smith	 thought,	 but	 of	 consumers.	 And	 full	 employment	 and	 the	
progressive	growth	of	workers’	wages	were	seen	as	 the	elements	 to	create	an	ever-expanding	
market.	
The	most	 significant	 aspect	 of	 Fordist	 policies,	 however,	 is	 an	 assumption	 that	 often	 goes	
unnoticed:	they	finally	accept	that	labour	and	its	market	cannot	play	the	role	of	the	driving	force	
behind	 the	 integration	of	 society.	Underlying	Fordism	 is	 an	awareness	 that	 the	worker-citizen	
equation	could	no	 longer	perform	the	function	of	 lintel	of	 the	social	order:	full	 integration	into	
the	labour	market	no	longer	seems	in	itself	a	sufficient	basis	to	guarantee	full	participation	in	the	
social	 and	 political	 life	 of	 the	 community.	 Between	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 and	 early	 twentieth	
century	this	idea	was	already	the	foundation	of	the	development	of	Welfarist	policies,	which	are	
not	by	chance	contemporary	to	the	birth	of	sociology.		
Instead,	 with	 Fordism	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 the	 core	 of	 the	 social	 order	 cannot	 be	 an	
individual	who	finds	the	meaning	of	his	existence	in	his	work	(which	may	consist	in	one	of	the	
seventeen	operations	necessary	 to	produce	a	pin).	 (Smith,	1776)	 In	his	place	 there	emerges	a	
‘consumerist’	individual,	driven	by	the	awareness	of	the	often	alienating	character	of	his	work	to	
seek	 the	meaning	 of	 life	 in	 consumption.	 This	 compensation	 for	 the	 ‘miseries’	 of	 work	 is	 the	
implicit	 promise	 of	 Fordist	 policies,	 based	on	 full	 employment	 guaranteed	by	 sufficiently	 high	




tool	 for	 creating	 responsible	 individuals	 to	 a	 tool	 for	 creating	 social	 consumers.	 This	
transformation	 is	 marked	 by	 the	 progressive	 shift	 of	 the	 causal	 origin	 of	 crime	 from	 an	
individual’s	free	moral	choice	to	his	more	or	less	pathological	condition.	(Cf.	Garland,	1990)	With	
the	 emergence	 of	 the	 social	 paradigm,	 the	 privileged	mode	 of	 social	 regulation	 changes	 from	
general	deterrence	to	strategies	of	prevention,	rehabilitation,	re-education	or	re-socialisation	of	
deviants.	As	 the	state,	 in	order	 to	allocate	 social	 rights,	 shatters	 the	unity	of	 the	citizen	status,	
which	characterized	the	classical	liberal	theory,	and	differentiates	individuals	according	to	their	
needs,	 creating	 the	 categories	 of	 ‘women’,	 ‘unemployed’,	 ‘pensioners’,	 etc.,	 so	 its	 penal	 system	













state”	 (O’Connor,	 1973)3	 broke	 out.	 The	 increase	 in	 state	 deficits	 seemed	 to	 impose	 a	 drastic	
rethinking	of	Keynesian	policies	and	a	substantial	tightening	of	social	spending.	In	fact,	as	Albert	
Hirschman	 (1991)	 pointed	 out,	 the	 crisis	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 is	 not	 a	 consequence	 of	 fiscal	
problems:	 the	 sudden	discovery	of	 the	 inefficiency	of	 its	 structures	was	but	an	 indication	 that	
their	underlying	political	project	appeared	unsustainable.	Disciplinary	technologies	were	widely	
perceived	 as	 not	 capable	 of	 managing	 consumer-based	 integration.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	
standardisation	 of	 needs	 that	 they	 brought	 about	 began	 to	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	 limitation	 of	
individual	freedom	and	a	paternalistic	interference.	On	the	other	hand,	this	same	standardization	
proves	 incapable	 of	 controlling	 the	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 multiplication	 of	 social	
consumption	 (a	multiplication	reinforced	by	 the	vast	migratory	phenomena	 that	have	affected	
north-western	countries).	Disciplinary	technologies	have	lost	their	overall	meaning:	the	type	of	
subject	 they	 favour,	 instead	 of	 being	 functional	 to	 the	 social	 order,	 seems	 to	 contribute	 to	
undermining	it,	overloading	it	with	demands	that	it	cannot	cope	with.		










of	 local	 efficiency	 and	 an	 enduring	 ability	 to	 deal	with	 immediate	 problems,	 at	 least	 for	 some	





to	 Roger	Matthews	 (2002)	 we	 are	 living	 a	 phase	 of	 trans-incarceration.5	 The	 agencies	 of	 the	
welfare	 state	 (medical,	 educational,	 social	 institutions)	 that	 take	 charge	 of	 the	 marginal	




flows	 (the	 “accumulation	 function”	 of	 the	 State);	 2)	 safeguard	 its	 own	 legitimacy	 by	 guaranteeing	 appropriate	 standards	 of	
consumption,	health	and	education	(the	“legitimation	function”	of	the	State).	These	two	contradictory	requirements	generate,	in	his	
view,	 budget	 deficits,	 inflation	 and	 fiscal	 revolt,	 and	 this	 leads	 him	 to	 argue	 that	 “the	 accumulation	 of	 social	 capital	 and	 social	



















Globalization	 and	exclusive	democracy:	Prison	 as	 an	 instrument	of	
the	dictatorship	of	a	frightened	class	
	





and	 untrue	 contents	 but	 in	 its	 ‘power-knowledge’	 functions)».	 We	 are	 therefore	 facing	 “a	
historical	 political	 crisis”.	 In	 this	 context,	 prison	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 disciplinary	 institution	 that	
managed	 to	 immediately	 redesign	 its	 function:	 it	 transformed	 itself	 by	 adapting	 to	 the	 crisis	
while	retaining	its	role	as	a	fundamental	bulwark	of	order.	











least	contingent,	 to	 the	problem	of	order.	Thanks	 to	migration,	 the	population’s	manipulability	
has	increased	disproportionately.	A	state	can	select	its	own	population	much	more	easily:	it	can	
build,	through	a	series	of	inclusive	and	excluding	mechanisms,	a	population	of	all	actors	capable	













‘autochthonous’	 majorities	 can	 only	 be	 guaranteed	 through	 the	 exclusion	 of	 migrant	 subjects	
(and	 often	 also	 of	 ‘undeserving’	 citizens)	 from	 these	 rights.	 In	 north-western	 countries,	 the	
criminalization	 of	 migrants	 has	 become	 one	 of	 the	 main	 flags	 of	 the	 reunification	 of	 society	
(Melossi,	2002,	p.	259):	a	reunification	carried	out	at	the	expense	of	migrants	themselves,	who	
are	used	as	resources	of	the	productive	system	and	at	the	same	time	excluded	from	welfare	and	
social	 security	 circuits.	 The	majority	 of	 public	 opinion	 in	north-western	 countries	 could	never	
accept	that	access	to	citizenship	rights	be	regulated	by	xenophobic	or	racist	criteria.	They	would	
never	 accept,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 idea	 that	 migrants	 should	 be	 excluded	 from	 social	 rights	
because	of	their	black	or	yellow	skin,	or	of	their	 ‘uncivilised’	practices.	Nor	would	it	be	easy	to	
accept	 a	 purely	 selfish	 perspective	 (with	 some	 slavery	 vein):	 we	 have	 few	 resources	 and	
therefore	migrants	cannot	expect	us	to	give	up	our	pensions,	our	ability	to	care	for	ourselves	–	
which	 are	 already	 in	 danger	 –	 to	 allow	 them	 an	 acceptable	 level	 of	 social	 security.	 Such	
approaches	only	resonate	with	some	minority,	and	often	exasperated,	sectors	of	north-western	








use	 for	 social	purposes,	 today’s	 society	has	decided	not	 to	 grant	offenders	 a	 second	 chance	of	
social	life.	As	the	prison	loses	its	resocialization	purpose,	the	detention	of	migrants	is	deprived	of	
any	 meaning	 other	 than	 to	 stigmatize	 them	 as	 ‘dangerous’	 individuals.	 While	 for	 Italian	 (or	
European)	 citizens	 there	 is	 no	 ‘elsewhere’	where	 they	 can	be	placed,	 for	migrants	 ‘elsewhere’	
there	is.	The	hunger	for	manpower	of	nineteenth	century	industrialization	having	disappeared,	
due	 to	 changed	production	methods	and	migratory	phenomena,	 there	are	no	more	 reasons	 to	
keep	 deviant	 migrants	 within	 the	 state	 political	 space.	 In	 addition,	 the	 disappearance	 of	 any	






Expulsion	 from	 political	 space,	 however,	 can	 also	 consist	 in	 a	 simple	 marginalization	 of	





of	 penality:	 in	 fact,	 it	 is	 the	 existence	 of	 this	 area	 of	 intra-state	 marginality	 that	 serves	 as	 a	
laboratory	to	test	prospective	citizens.	The	typical	path	of	migrants	in	Italy	is	characterized	by	a	
period	 of	 irregularity	 and	marginality	 in	which	 they	 are	 tested:	 those	who	 prove	 to	 be	 ‘good	
citizens’,	 that	 is,	 who	 accept	 to	 live	 without	 guarantees,	 without	 rights	 and	 in	 total	




This	 situation	 is	 not	 surprising:	 the	new	 criminal	 policies	 only	 reflect	 the	 sclerosis	 of	what	
Peter	 Glotz	 (1985)	 has	 called	 “the	 two-thirds	 society”,	 a	 society	 in	 which	 a	 significant	 but	
minority	 share	 of	 individuals	 is	 excluded	 from	 well-being	 and	 the	 political	 tools	 needed	 to	
achieve	 it.	 Opulent	 democracies	 have	 turned	 into	 dictatorships	 of	 a	 frightened	 class:	 what	
interests	the	European	middle	classes,	who	have	become	the	majority	thanks	to	welfare	policies,	
is	 to	 prevent	 indiscriminate	 access	 to	 citizenship	 rights	 from	 considerably	 reducing	 their	
traditional	 social	 guarantees.	 After	 the	 vanishing	 of	 the	 Fordist	 and	welfarist	 narrative,	which	
promised	 a	 positive	 sum	 development	 of	well-being	whereby	 the	 improved	 conditions	 of	 the	
weakest	sections	of	the	population	would	lead	to	the	improvement	of	everyone’s	conditions,	the	
citizens	of	European	countries	have	come	to	believe	that	social	rights	are	a	zero	sum	game.	They	
fear	 that	 extending	 welfare	 benefits	 will	 worsen	 the	 reduction	 of	 their	 benefits,	 already	
underway	as	a	result	of	the	phenomena	of	economic	and	financial	globalization.	For	this	reason,	
they	entrust	prison	with	the	role	of	legitimizing	the	exclusion,	first	of	all,	of	migrants,	but	also	of	






of	 controlling	 marginalization	 produce	 control-generated	 marginalisation.	 Lemert’s	 teaching	
seems	to	have	been	fully	understood,	not	as	a	reason	to	doubt	criminalization	policies	but	as	a	
strategy	for	producing	 legitimacy.	The	social	construction	of	 the	 ‘marginal’	as	 ‘dangerous’	ends	
up	accentuating	his	 real	dangerousness,	and	 therefore	 legitimising	new	strategies	of	excluding	
and	criminalizing	classes	of	marginal	individuals.	
From	 a	 sociological	 point	 of	 view,	 it	 must	 be	 recognised	 that	 north-western	 democratic	
citizens	 have	 always	 feared	 crime	 and	 encouraged	 politicians	 to	 adopt	 repressive	 laws.	
Protecting	the	fundamental	rights	of	those	recognised	as	deviants	has	always	been	the	heritage	
of	an	expert	and	enlightened	knowledge	which,	in	particular	sectors	of	the	political	world	and	the	
                                                









administration,	 has	 been	 opposed	 to	 the	 punitive	 impulse	 (which	 has	 always	 shown	 up	with	
particular	 force	 in	 the	 face	of	serious	criminal	acts).	The	crisis	of	 the	 ‘citizen-consumer’	model	
has	undermined	the	credibility	of	‘re-educational’	criminal	policies	and	has	disrupted	the	balance	
between	vindictive	 impulses	and	rights	protection	 in	 the	phase	of	 sentence	execution.	Current	




the	 mask	 of	 equality	 behind	 which	 it	 has	 always	 hidden,	 but	 perhaps	 what	 we	 call	 (legal)	
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